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ABSTRACT 
In this paper the writer proposes to focus on the Closely 
Held Company ("CHC") and its treatment in New Zealand and 
in foreign legal jurisdictions. 
In particular the paper will examine the position of the 
CHC under the Companies Act 1955 and under the new 
companies Act 1993. There will also be a discussion and 
analysis of the approach of the courts to this corporate 
entity. 
The paper contains, in Part II, a draft of a Constitution 
designed to meet the specific needs of the CHC under the 
new legislation. It is the writer's opinion that a 
constitution will be one of the foundation incorporation 
documents of the CHC. The variety and format of these 
constitutions will depend on the specific circumstances of 
each CHC. Nevertheless, there will be certain common 
clauses in all CHC constitutions, because of the nature of 
the displaceable rules contained in the new Act. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes 
and bibliography) comprises approximately 12,000 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Companies Act 1993 ("the Act") is intended, according 
to its drafter and major proponent, the New Zealand Law 
Commission, to provide New Zealand with a substantially 
simplified statute, containing "core" company law governing 
the incorporation, organisation and termination of 
Companies. 1 In the view of the Commission: 
"a good system of company law should provide a 
simple and cheap method of incorporation and 
company organisation which is flexible enough to 
meet the needs of diverse organisations. 2 
The focus of this paper is the Closely Held Company ( "CHC") 
and the likely impact of the Act on this common corporate 
entity. 
The paper is divided into two parts. In part I the writer, 
presents an overview of the CHC and proposes to demonstrate 
that the Act, does not provide a statutory regime flexible 
enough to meet the specific needs of the CHC. 
In Part II, the paper contains a draft constitution 
designed to meet the needs of the CHC, to the extent 
permissible by the displaceable provisions of the Act. 
In particular, Part I of the paper will: 
(i) define the nature and common characteristics of 
the CHC., 
(ii) identify the needs that are specific to the CHC 
1Law Commission (NZ) Company Law Reform and Restatement 
Report No. 9 1989 Government Printing Office, Wellington. pp283 
2Ibid, page 4 
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because of the nature of the entity., 
provide a brief overview of the position of the 
CHC under the Companies Act 1955 ( "the 1955 
Act") and at common law., 
(iv) for comparison purposes, examine the legislative 
approach taken in respect of the CHC in selected 
foreign jurisdictions., 
(v) discuss the rationale for the abolition of the 
distinction drawn in the 1955 Act between public 
and private companies., 
(vi) outline the mechanics of incorporation and 
reincorporation under the Act and analyse the 
requirements of Part IV of the Act which relate 
to the filing, or adoption of a constitution by 
a company., 
(vii) 
(viii) 
examine one example of a non-displaceable 
provision in the Act and its likely effect on 
the CHC., 
examine a number of the displaceable provisions 
in the Act and examine which of those the CHC 
may choose to opt out of by constitution. 
In Part II, the paper contains a draft CHC constitution 
cross referenced to sections in the Act. Where appropriate 
the relevant constitutional clauses will be accompanied by 
commentary and analysis to illustrate the relevance of the 
clause in meeting the specific requirements of the CHC. 
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PART I 
THE CLOSLEY HELD COMPANY - AN OVERVJEW 
1. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHC 
Commentators have identified a number of distinctive 
features common to the CHC. These include: 
( i) 
( ii) 
( iii) 
A small number of shareholders., 
Those shareholders are usually also the 
company's directors and are involved in the day 
to day running of the business., 
The company does not raise capital by inviting 
the public to subscribe for its shares and its 
shares are not listed or traded on the share 
market. , 
(iv) There are restrictions placed on the transfer of 
shares outside of a limited group of people., 
(v) The shareholders often derive their principal 
income from the business of the company and much 
of their personal wealth is invested in the 
company., 
Most CHC's are little more than incorporated partnerships. 
The typical CHC generally operates on an informal basis 
where flexibility in management, control over who can hold 
shares and over fundamental change are essential features, 
that protect the interests of each member. 
By way of contrast the large public company which has 
shares listed on the Stock Exchange has its own distinctive 
features. These features include; separation of ownership 
and control and the provision of a ready market for the 
publics' investment capital. 
5 
2. REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIC TO THE CHC 
Those features listed above that distinguish the CHC from 
other larger corporate entities also give rise to a set of 
specific operational requirements. These operational 
requirements are essential to the efficient functioning of 
the CHC. 
These operational requirements include the following: 
(i} the requirement that day to 
decisions can be made with 
informality without the need 
checks and controls being 
decisions by legislation., 
day management 
flexibility and 
for unnecessary 
placed on such 
( ii} the requirement that the members of the CHC 
should be able to exercise control over the 
transfer of shares in the company to outside 
interests, of whom they do not approve., 
( iii} the requirement that the members of the CHC 
should be able to prevent fundamental change in 
the business enterprise or corporate structure 
unless their is majority consensus or in many 
cases total unanimity amongst shareholders., 
(iv} the requirement that the shareholders (whom will 
often have contributed much of their personal 
wealth to the enterprise} can realise that 
investment even though there may not be a ready 
market for the shares in the company. 
The requirements set out above are among the most important 
concerns facing the members of a CHC. Where the Bill does 
... 
-
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not specifically meet these requirements then, as the Law 
Commission has stated: 
"the presumptions of the draft Act can 
explicitly be replaced by the constitution of 
the particular company". 
The validity of this statement will be analysed in the 
course of this paper. The writer proposes to draw a 
sustainable conclusion with respect to the adequacy of the 
Law Commission's approach to the CHC. 
3. PRIVATE/PUBLIC COMPANY DISTINCTION UNDER THE 1955 ACT 
The closest that the CHC came to having a kind of statutory 
recognition in New Zealand was the distinction drawn, in 
the 1955 Act, between the private and public company. 
A. PRIVATE COMPANIES UNDER THE 1955 ACT 
The 1955 Act specifically def ined3 and provided for the 
incorporation of a private company. 4 The term public 
company, whilst not specifically defined, is by clear 
implication one incorporated under the 1955 Act which does 
not meet the criteria to be a private company under the 
same. The 1955 Act places significantly lesser obligations 
on the private company and correspondingly much greater 
statutory control on the public company. 
The main rationale for the 1955 Act imposing greater 
statutory controls on the public company is a perceived and 
actual need to protect the public investor. One company 
3companies Act 1955 s.2(1). 
4Ibid Part VIII 
---
-
1111 
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text states that: 
"the directors of public companies are very much 
in the position of trustees managing other 
people's (ie the public's) funds through a 
Corporate structure"5 
By contrast, the private company was often no more than an 
incorporated partnership where usually only a limited 
number of shareholders and creditors were exposed to 
potential loss. 
Notwithstanding the contrast in size between the majority 
of private companies and the large publicly listed company, 
the economic importance of the former cannot be ignored. 
Approximately 95% of all companies incorporated in New 
Zealand are private companies. While, not all of these are 
necessarily closely held in the true sense of that term, 
this statistic alone, makes a good case for separate 
legislation for the CHC. 
There were considerably fewer statutory controls placed on 
a private company under the 1955 Act. Sections 353 and 365 
contained in Part VIII of that Act both defined what 
constituted a private company and set out a number of 
requirements of specific application to private companies 
only. These requirements included the following: 
(i) The maximum number of persons forming a private 
company could not exceed 25., 6 
(ii) The minimum number of persons required to form 
a private company was two and the company needed 
5Beck and Barrowdale, Guidebook to New Zealand 
Companies and Securities Law (CCH, Auckland 1990) at page 
11 
6Above N.3, s.253 
------
--
( iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
8 
at least one director., 7 
Unless it was a non-exempt private company8 the 
company was not required to file a balance sheet 
or auditors report with the Registrar of 
Companies., 9 
Unless it was a subsidiary of a public company 
or non-exempt, the private company need not 
appoint an auditor and could pass a unanimous 
resolution to this effect., 10 
Notwithstanding (iv) above the Registrar could, 
at his discretion, require appointment of an 
auditor to the company upon application being 
made to him by any member or creditor of the 
company., 11 
A sole director could not also hold office as 
the secretary of the company. , 12 
The Memorandum of Association had to state that 
the company was a private company. 13 
(viii) All of the share capital of a private company 
had to be subscribed for by the signatories to 
7Above N.3, s.354(2) (a) (i) 
8A non-exempt private company was defined in Section 
354(3B) and required to appoint an auditor and file its 
Balance Sheet 
9Ibid s.354(2A) 
lOibid S.354(3) 
11Ibid s. 354(3)(c) 
12Ibid s. 3 55 
13Ibid s.356(1) 
-----1• 
I 
9 
the Memorandum of Association.,~ 
(ix) There were penalties for knowingly allowing the 
membership of the Company to increase beyond the 
maximum of 25, although there were exceptions 
made for employee shareholders. , 15 
(x) The private company was not permitted to issue 
a prospectus inviting subscription for its 
shares., 16 
(xi) Any increase in capital had to be fully 
subscribed for., 17 
(xii) 
(xiii) 
(xiv) 
14Ibid 
15Ibid 
16Ibid 
17Ibid 
18Ibid 
19Ibid 
The private company could do anything authorised 
by the 1955 Act by resolution entered in its 
minute book and passed without the need to call 
a meeting of the company. The resolution had to 
be signed by at least 75% of the members holding 
in aggregate a minimum of 75% of the shares in 
the company. , 18 
The private company did not need to hold an 
Annual General Meeting, provided it did all that 
was required by resolution entered in the minute 
book, within the time prescribed for holding its 
Annual General Meeting., 19 
On a Winding Up, additional powers were given to 
s.356(2) 
s.359 
s.360 
s.361 
s.362 
s.362(2) 
• 
--------
-------
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the court, in respect of the private company, to 
attribute liability to members for certain acts 
or omissions. , 20 
(xv) A private company could change its status and 
make application for re-registration as a public 
company . 21 
Finally, the ninth schedule set out a list of the 
provisions of the 1955 Act with no application to the 
private company. 
B. PUBLIC COMPANIES UNDER THE 1955 ACT 
The clear intention of the 1955 Act was to exempt the 
private company from many of the obligations that applied 
to a public company. 
To better evaluate the policy reasons for favouring the 
private company with these exemptions it is necessary to 
look at some of the weightier obligations imposed 
exclusively on the public company by the 1955 Act. 
To state the position in simple terms, all sections of the 
1955 Act, with the exception of those which relate 
specifically to the private company distinction,n apply 
or have relevance to the public company. 
Specific examples of obligations imposed by the 1955 Act 
on public companies exclusively, included: 
(i) The requirement that the public company that 
issued a prospectus to the public to subscribe 
20Ibid s.364 
21 Ibid s.365 
nibid ss.353 to 365 
--------,. 
-,. 
---
--
( ii) 
( iii) 
(iv) 
23Ibid 
24Ibid 
25Ibid 
26Ibid 
11 
for its shares, only commence business and 
exercise borrowing powers when each director of 
the company, paid to the company the minimum 
subscription value of their own shares, such 
payment to be equal to that payable by or on 
offer to the public. The company had to confirm 
that this requirement had been fulfilled by 
statutory declaration to the Registrar before 
the company would be issued with a certificate 
authorising it to commence business. 23 By 
contrast the private company could commence 
business on the day of its incorporation, 
although all its shares had to be subscribed for 
by its members at that date., 
The requirements that the public company hold a 
"statutory meeting" in either the second or 
third months after it became entitled to 
commence business and to make available a 
"statutory report" stating inter alia: shares 
allotted, cash received in respect of shares 
allotted, details of receipts and payments made, 
and details of the directors and secretary of 
the company. , 24 
The requirement that there be a minimum of seven 
members and at least two directors.,~ 
The requirement to hold separate elections for 
each individual seeking a directorship.,M 
s.117 
s.134 
s.180 
s.186 
--------• , 
----,. 
-
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
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The requirement to file its Balance Sheet with 
the Registrar.,v 
The requirement that it hold an annual general 
meeting. , 28 
The requirement that an auditor had to be 
appointed. 29 
It can be seen from the brief summary above, that many of 
the requirements to which the public company was 
exclusively subject placed an emphasis on accounting and 
disclosure. The rationale of the legislature in imposing 
these strictures on the public company was the desirability 
of imposing more rigorous accounting and audit requirements 
to protect the public investor . 
C. PRIVATE COMPANY ARTICLES 
Most private companies when incorporated, filed Articles 
of Association. Such articles usually contained a 
statement that the Regulations in Table A in the Third 
Schedule to the 1955 Act shall not apply to the company. 
As one writer has commented: 
"Table A has been drafted in terms of a large 
public company where there is a separation of 
ownership and control, an entity which has very 
different needs to the closely held 
corporation". 30 
vibid s.133 
28Ibid s.135 
29Ibid s. 163 
3°aates R. J. Closely Held Companies and the Companies 
Bill. Too Close for Comfort? LLM Research Paper 1991 at 
page 7. 
------
DO 
-., 
-,. 
--1• 
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The regulations contained in Table A were not well tailored 
to meet the requirements of the private company and were 
therefore usually replaced with the company's own set of 
Articles. 
By way of example, clause 84 of Table A was often modified 
in the Articles of the private company. Clause 84 related 
to Section 199 of the 1955 Act, and the requirement that 
a director declared any interest he may have in a contract 
or proposed contract with the company. 
Clause 84(2) however was seen as quite restrictive to the 
very small two or three member company, in that it 
prohibited an interested director from voting or having his 
vote counted in respect of a contract in which he was 
interested. If there were only two directors, and one of 
the directors had to disqualify himself from voting, 
obvious difficulties arose, since the quorum necessary for 
the transaction of business could not be met. 
The simple answer to the problem was for the private 
company to take advantage of the right to contract out of 
the 1955 Act. 31 The Articles registered in substitution 
for Table A would usually provide: 
(i) that the interested director must declare the 
nature of his interest at the meeting; and 
(ii) that notwithstanding such interest the director 
may vote in respect of any contract in which he 
is interested. 
The need for this modification in the case of the closely 
held private company is apparent. However, the public 
company which will often have a large board of directors 
31Above N.3, s.22 
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would still be able to efficiently transact business 
notwithstanding the self-disqualification of one of its 
directors under Clause 84 of Table A. 
As will be seen in Part II of this paper, this method of 
modification of a statutory rule has its parallels in the 
ability of Companies to file a constitution under the 
provisions of the new Act. 
4. PRIVATE/PUBLIC COMPANY DISTINCTION AT COMMON LAW 
The 1955 Act then, created two distinct entities. If the 
legislators had identified a need for the distinction, one 
might expect that the Courts would also recognise that 
closely held private companies should be treated 
differently from public companies. 
The majority of the previous statutory rules relating to 
private companies dealt with the mechanics of structure and 
incorporation, and with the disclosure requirements. The 
courts have identified additional areas not specifically 
dealt with by the 1955 Act, where the distinction has lead 
them to treat private companies differently from public 
companies. 
It is proposed to look briefly at one area of company law, 
that of winding up, where the size of a company in terms 
of the number of its members has been seen by the courts 
as a major rationale for reaching a decision in a given 
case. 
Section 217 of the 1955 Act set out circumstances where a 
company could be wound up by the Court. Under Section 
217(f) a company could be wound up by the Court if: 
"the Court is of an opinion that it is just and 
--
-
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equitable that the company should be wound up". 
The leading case dealing with the "Just and Equitable" 
ground in relation to closely held companies is that of 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360. 
The case involved a former two man partnership which became 
a two, and then a three shareholder company. A series of 
disputes between the original two founders of the business 
lead to one of the founders being removed as a director by 
an ordinary resolution. The dismissed director was left 
a minority shareholder, minus his directors income and 
effectively shut out from management of the business he 
helped found and nurture. 
In part of his judgment Lord Wilberforce stated that: 
" a limited company is more than a mere 
judicial entity, with a personality in law of 
its own . . . there is room in company law for 
recognition of the fact that behind it, or 
amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, 
expectations and objections inter se which are 
not necessarily submerged in the company 
structure. 1132 
It was this recognition of the rights of the individual by 
the House of Lords and the concern that these rights should 
not be submerged by a corporate structure, that lead to the 
courts decision in Ebrahimi. The Court decided that 
although the resolution to remove Ebrahimi as a director 
was valid, it was inequitable, in that it effectively 
repudiated the essential (although unwritten) agreement 
between the parties dating from the days of their original 
partnership, that management and profits (or losses) would 
be shared. 
32 [ 19 7 3 ] AC 3 6 0 
,. 
1• 
------1• 
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The Ebrahimi decision recognised that many private 
companies (especially the small 2-3 man operations) are 
little more than incorporated partnerships. In these 
companies success or failure will often depend on being 
able to trust ones fellow director/shareholder. If that 
trust is destroyed and the members are in conflict, then 
it may be just and equitable for the company to be wound 
up. 
It should be noted however, that merely the fact that a 
company is a private company will not necessarily mean that 
the equitable obligations discussed in Ebrahimi will apply. 
One or more additional elements must be present: 
( i) The members relationship must be based on 
confidence and mutual trust similar to that 
found in a business partnership, or; 
(ii) There must be a written or verbal agreement that 
all, or a readily identifiable number of members 
are able to participate in the day to day 
running of the business, or; 
( iii) There must exist a restriction on share 
transfers making it difficult for a disaffected 
member who is shut out of management to sell his 
shareholding and move on. 
It is submitted, that the case recognises, that the closely 
held private company is a different animal from its cousin 
the public company. Undoubtedly, public companies should 
also be founded on trust and confidence between members. 
However, it is not the same as the trust placed by one 
director in a two member firm in his fellow director as 
they operate the corner dairy business. This is a trust 
which is crucial to the effective conduct and survival of 
the business. 
----
I 
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The trust and confidence placed in a board of directors of 
a public company by investors buying its shares, is not the 
kind of trust that the House of Lords was contemplating in 
Ebrahimi. It is debatable whether it should give rise to 
any equitable obligations when there will in any event, 
continue to be much greater statutory controls on the 
public company. 
The relationship of the public company with its 
shareholders is not usually one of day to day contact where 
each shareholder is also a director and participates in the 
running of the business. The relationship is generally 
much more remote than this. There are not the same 
similarities with the partnership business, that 
incorporates to take advantage of limited liability. 
In the case of the incorporated partnership, the damage 
that can be done by a majority of members joining forces 
to shut out another member or members is much greater. It 
can mean financial ruin for the party shut out. In the 
public company scenario, a disaffected shareholder will 
usually be able to sell his shares. It is submitted, 
therefore, that the rational for imposing equitable 
obligations on the closely held private company is clearly 
established. Business partners do fall out, and when they 
do they may need protection from the lawful, but in some 
cases oppressive and unjust actions of their colleagues. 
5. APPROACH OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
The Law Commission has acknowledged that legislative 
"working models" in both Canada and the United States were 
an influence in drafting some of the reforms contained in 
the Act. 33 
33Above N. 1, page 9 
----• , 
---• , 
1a1 
---., 
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The following is a brief outline of the approach taken to 
company law and the CHC in particular in three foreign 
jurisdictions. An assessment will be made in the 
conclusion to this paper as to how the Bill measures up by 
comparison to these jurisdictions and their treatment of 
the CHC . 
A AUSTRALIA - CLOSE CORPORATIONS ACT 1989 
Australia has provided specifically for the CHC in its 
Close Corporations Act 1989 ("CCA"). The legislation was 
developed by the Companies and Securities Law Review 
Committee and recognises that the incorporated small 
business enterprise does not need to have the same 
extensive financial reporting requirements of the larger 
public company . 
Some of the features of the CCA include: 
(i) The Close Corporation ("CC") is still recognised 
as being a Company in the usual sense with 
perpetual succession and other common corporate 
attributes., 
(ii) Any natural persons not exceeding 10 in number 
can form a cc.,~ 
( iii) The cc must have a fully paid up share 
capital. , 35 
(iv) On incorporation the cc must file a founding 
statement which contains similar details to 
those found in a Memorandum of Association under 
~Close corporation Act 1989 (Australia) ss 16, 60, 61 
35Ibid s. 17 
(v) 
19 
our 1955 Act. , 36 
In order for it to be identified as such, a 
company incorporating under the CCA must have 
the words "Close Corporation" or the letters 
"CC" at the end of its name.,n 
(vi) The cc is prohibited from offering its shares 
for sale to the public. , 38 
(vii) 
(viii) 
It need not appoint an auditor, or file accounts 
in any public registry, and, although it must 
keep appropriate accounting records,B these are 
not required to be offered up for public 
scrutiny., 
The cc is required to file notice of any changes 
in those matters contained in its founding 
statement. , 40 
(ix) It must file an annual activity statement and 
(x) 
lodge an activity statement on 
setting out the nature of 
activities. , 41 
incorporation 
its trading 
The CCA allows for the cc to have only one 
member., 
(xi) It also abandons any distinction between 
36Ibid s.25 
37Ibid s.31 
38Ibid s.51 
39Ibid s.82 
40Ibid s.20 
41 Ibid s.25 
---------
·--• 
(xii) 
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director and member, but members may formally 
agree which member or members will wield 
executive power., 
Part 7 of the CCA deals with Internal 
Administration and allows for the members to 
enter into what is known as an Association 
Agreement analogous to Articles of Association 
under the 1955 Act setting out how the CC' s 
affairs will be managed. A model association 
agreement has been included as part of the 
legislation and will apply, unless the cc adopts 
its own agreement. 
B GENERAL CORPORATION LAW OF DELAWARE 1979 - ONE UNITED 
STATES APPROACH TO CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
Unlike in Australia, Delaware does not have a separate Act 
dealing with the CHC. However, it does give statutory 
recognition within its company legislation to the CHC as 
a separate and unique entity that requires its own set of 
rules. 
Within the General Corporation Law of Delaware 1979 there 
is a sub chapter XIV, that applies only to CHC or Close 
Corporations. The specific provisions are contained in 
Sections 341 through to 356. A company will not be subject 
to those sections unless it elects to become a Close 
Corporation42 using the procedure set out in the sub-
chapter. 43 Where a company does not so elect it remains 
subject to the provisions of the statute as a whole. 44 
USA) 
42General Corporation Law of Delaware 1979 s341 (Del 
0 Ibid ss343 and 344 
44Ibid s.341(a) 
----
1a1 
--------
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Where election takes place the provisions of the general 
statute apply except to the extent that the sub chapter 
otherwise provides.~ 
The elective rights given by the Delaware legislation 
recognise that some companies that could qualify as a CHC 
may not find it advantageous to be subject to the 
provisions of sub chapter XIV. 
Some of the more important features contained in sub-
chapter XIV include: 
{ i) 
{ii) 
{ iii) 
A concise definition of a CHC which; limits 
shareholders to a maximum of thirty; requires 
shares be subject to restrictions on transfer 
and prohibits the company making a "public 
offering" of its shares., 46 
The requirement that the Certificate of 
Incorporation contain a heading stating the 
Company name and that it is a Close Corporation. 
The Certificate is also required to contain 
statements confirming the maximum number of 
shareholders, a prohibition on public offerings 
and share transfer restrictions.,~ 
Provisions that contain special procedures to 
prevent accidental loss of CHC status and allow 
for restoration of such status in those 
circumstances. , 48 
45Ibid s. 3 41 ( b) 
46Ibid s. 342. It is notable that this definition 
echoes some of defining characteristics of the private 
company under the Companies Act 1955 
47Ibid s. 3 4 3 
48Ibid ss347-348 
--
1a1 
---., 
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(iv) A provision permitting the dispensing with a 
board of directors and allowing the affairs of 
the CHC to be managed directly by its 
shareholders. , 49 
(v) Provisions that permit the appointment of a 
custodian or provisional director where a 
deadlock occurs. 
It is worthwhile noting here that The General Corporation 
Law of Delaware 1979 itself, independent of the sub-
chapter, contains provisions that are conducive to the 
management of a CHC. In the words of one commentator: 
" irrespective of the number of stockholders 
or whether its stock is subject to transfer 
restrictions or has been offered for sale 
publicly, a corporation is permitted by various 
sections of the Corporation Law to enjoy 
characteristics that may be useful to Close 
Corporation management."m 
C CANADA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT 1975 
The Canadian approach contained in the Canada Business 
Corporations Act 1975 ("CBCA") more closely resembles the 
approach of our new Act, than the Delaware and Australian 
legislation. This is acknowledged by the Law Commission 
in its Company Law Reform and Restatement Report No. 9. 51 
The Canadians do not have a separate statute dealing with 
49Ibid s.351 
mFolk on Delaware General Corporation Law Third Ed 
1992 Volume III at page XIV:3. 
51At paragraph 32 page 9 (see N .1, Above) 
--------
I I 
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the CHC, nor do they have a separate part in their statute 
which contains specific elective provisions designed to 
benefit the CHC. 
The Canadians also abandoned the public/private company 
distinction with the enactment of the CBCA. Much like the 
Act, the CBCA was intended as "core" company law applicable 
to, and catering for all companies including, but not 
specifically, the CHC. 
The CBCA, unlike the Act, does continue to draw a 
distinction of sorts, by varying the requirements it places 
on a company depending on whether or not it distributes 
shares to the public. In the words of one commentator: 
"In terms of financial information 
Corporations which do not distribute shares to 
the public are relieved from the requirement of 
having to file annual financial statements with 
the administrative official supervising the Act, 
are not subject to the mandatory directions to 
appoint an audit committee and are permitted to 
waive, by unanimous shareholder approval, the 
statutory obligation to appoint an auditor. 1152 
Some other important features of the CBCA, as they relate 
to the CHC include: 
(i) 
( ii) 
Provisions giving statutory recognition 
unanimous shareholder agreements.," 
to 
The introduction of remedies for oppression 
52B. R. Che ff ins "US Close Corporations Legislation -
a model Canada should not follow" 35 McGill Law Journal 
160, December 1989 at page 169 
"canada Business Corporations Act 1974/75/76. 
SS 117, 142, 146, 190 & 241. 
t:AW UGRMW . 
VICTORIA Ut'~\VERSITY OF WELLlt-lGTO!il 
-----., 
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against minority shareholders., 
Provisions providing for flexibility in internal 
regulations including, by way of example, 
permitting directors and shareholders by 
consent, to conduct business by resolution, 
without the requirement that a meeting be 
called. 
Generally the CBCA does not attempt to meet the needs of 
the CHC through a collection of tailor-made provisions with 
exclusive application. It does recognise the importance 
of placing greater statutory control on those corporates 
that distribute shares to the public. 
Its major concession to the CHC may well be in its 
recognition of shareholder agreements, whereby, a company 
can agree (with some legislative constraints of course) 
among its members as to how it will regulate itself, as it 
daily transacts its business. 
D THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
A comparatively recent development in the United States is 
the Limited Liability Company (LLC}. This form of business 
entity emerged in the late 1980s. Wyoming was among the 
first states to give the form statutory recognition in its 
Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act 1989.~ 
The most important characteristics of the LLC are that it 
is a non-corporate entity that nonetheless provides limited 
liability for its members. Those members are also 
permitted direct involvement in management of the business 
of the LLC without the loss of their limited liability. 
~Wyo. Stat. SS 17-15-101 to -136 (Supp. 1989) 
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Members of an LLC make capital contributions, the extent 
of which will usually be recorded in its articles of 
organisation, rather than by the issue of any form of 
certification. Most LLC statutes place restrictions on the 
transfer of interests in an LLC by its members. Usually 
an outsider may only gain membership rights to participate 
in management by unanimous consent of the other members. 
There are therefore clear similarities between the LLC and 
the statutory CHC recognised in the USA in that both place 
restrictions on transferability of ownership to outsiders. 
Also, typical CHC statutory provisions in the USA permit 
shareholders to participate in management directly without 
the need to appoint a board of directors. 
The emergence of the LLC appears to have been driven to a 
large extent by favourable tax rulings in the USA that have 
classified the LLC as a partnership for taxation purposes. 
It is clearly not a corporate entity in that, unlike a 
company it will dissolve upon the departure of one or more 
of its members. It therefore has the tax benefits of a 
partnership coupled with the benefits of limited liability 
usually only associated with the company." 
The Limited Liability Company is another example of a 
foreign jurisdiction recognising the need to cater for 
diversity in business. The approach in the USA contrasts 
sharply with that of our own legislators. The Act seeks 
to provide for a diverse range of corporate entities in one 
piece of legislation. In the USA the legislators appear 
to prefer to accommodate a number of different business 
entities, in separate and specific pieces of legislation. 
Whilst recognising that the two jurisdictions differ 
considerably in size and structure, the writer is of the 
view that there is a good case to be made for New Zealand 
55For a more detailed discussion of the LLC see R.R. 
Keatinge et al., 47 The Business Lawyer. 1992. 
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to have its own separate statute for the CHC. 
6. ABOLITION OF THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC COMPANY DISTINCTION 
One of the features of the Act is that it abolishes the 
distinction between private and public companies. It is 
proposed to examine this feature of the Act in more detail. 
On balance the Private/Public Company distinction was not 
worth preserving. The distinction was in many respects 
arbitrary, based on the number of members of the company 
and not tailored specifically enough to recognise and meet 
the needs of the incorporated small business. 
The Law Commission had no difficulty in concluding that the 
Private/Public distinction should be abandoned. However, 
it is interesting to note that it seriously considered 
including specific provisions for the CHC in the Act. It 
decided not to do so, stating, that in its view: 
"the draft Act provides the flexibility required 
by shareholders of closely held corporations 
"and "The only structural requirement that the 
company cannot opt out of is the need for at 
least one director. It seems to the Law 
Commission that this requirement is hardly 
onerous enough to justify the provision of a 
different system for closely held 
corporations". 56 
The abolition of the Private/Public distinction plays an 
important part in achieving one of the Law Commissions 
major aims, that of simplifying company legislation. The 
intention is that the Act should codify the legal 
requirements applicable to all companies. Accordingly, if 
56Above N. 1, page 5 6 
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one agrees with the Commissions approach, it is not 
desirable for the Act to contain rules that apply to one 
corporate entity and not another. 
Although arbitrary, the distinction drawn in the 1955 Act 
did have some direct benefits to the CHC by exempting the 
private company from a number of onerous statutory 
requirements. For example, as noted above in this paper, 
the private company need not file a balance sheet or 
appoint an auditor. Both are requirements for which there 
were no valid public policy reasons that would dictate that 
they should apply to the private company. 
With the abolition of the distinction, a small two person 
company that operates a retail outlet in the local mall, 
is treated under the Act in the same way as the large 
public investment company with hundreds of shareholders. 
In view of the general application of the Acts provisions, 
it is submitted that the CHC will need to provide for its 
own specific 
constitution. 
requirements where permissible, by 
Part IV of the Act and the extent of its 
application, are therefore of considerable importance to 
the CHC. 
7. PARTS II AND IV COMPANIES ACT 1993 
Part II of the Act deals with the essential requirements 
for a company and the method by which incorporation can be 
effected. 
Section 6 sets out the barest of minimum requirements that 
must be met by the proposed incorporator, when submitting 
an application for incorporation to the registrar. The 
effect of the section is that it will be possible to 
incorporate with an approved company name, a single share, 
-
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shareholder, and director. 
The application for registration will contain much of the 
information previously submitted to the registrar under the 
1955 Act. This will include a name reservation, consents 
of directors and consents of shareholders authorising the 
taking by them of the number of shares specified in the 
document. Full addresses, of officers and shareholders and 
location of registered office must be supplied, together 
with an address for service.n 
Neither Articles of Association nor a Memorandum of 
Association are required. However, section 8(1) (f) 
provides that where a company is to have a constitution, 
the application must be accompanied by a document certified 
by one or more of the applicants as being the company's 
constitution. 
The provisions dealing specifically with the Company 
Constitution are contained in Part IV of the Act. One of 
the features of the provisions contained in this part of 
the Act is that a company need not submit a constitutional 
document in order to incorporate. 
If a company does file a constitution it is still bound by 
the provisions of the Act except to the extent that the Act 
will allow its provisions to be modified or negated by 
constitution. 58 Conversely, if a company does not file a 
constitution, or adopt one following incorporation, the Act 
is designed as a comprehensive Company Law code. The 
drafters' intention being to provide, in the one statute, 
all the rules necessary to regulate the company, without 
it needing a constitution of its own. 
ncompanies Act 1993 s.8 
58 Ibid , s . 2 6 B 
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It is submitted (as shall be demonstrated later in this 
paper) that the incorporators of a CHC will be 
disadvantaged if they do not have a constitution. They 
will want to opt out of a number of the unwarranted 
restrictions that would be imposed if they were to accept 
the Act as the Statutory Constitution for their company. 
a. NON-DISPLACEABLE RULES - AN EXAMPLE 
Section 26B(l) of the Act states that: 
"The Constitution of a company has no effect to 
the extent that is contravenes, or is 
inconsistent with, this Act." 
The section presupposes that some of the provisions in the 
Act cannot be opted out of by a company in its 
constitution. 
In fact a number of the rules in the Act are non-
displaceable, many of these justifiably so, as they are 
fundamental rules of Company Law. However, some of the 
non-displaceable rules will undoubtedly prove unnecessarily 
restrictive to the CHC. For the purposes of this paper it 
is proposed to briefly examine here, one example of a 
non-displaceable rule and its likely effect on the CHC. 
Section 85 of the Act provides that company shareholders 
may only exercise certain powers by special resolution. 
One of those powers is to approve a "major transaction" as 
defined in section 107(2). 
A "special resolution" must be approved by a majority of 
seventy five percent of shareholders entitled to vote.
59 
59Ibid, s. 2 ( 1) 
----., 
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For a CHC with two or more equal shareholders the effect 
of these provisions could prove restrictive. For example, 
XYZ Limited has five equal shareholders, two of whom have 
left New Zealand, independently, to travel overseas on 
business. During their absence, XYZ Limited have the 
opportunity to enter into a major transaction, lets say the 
purchase of a retail premises. They must enter into the 
agreement to purchase and borrow funds equivalent to the 
greater part of the value of the assets of the company 
(before the transaction) prior to the return of their 
fell ow shareholders. In these circumstances the Act 
prevents XYZ Limited from entering into the transaction 
unless they are by some means able to have one or both of 
the absent directors sign a special resolution.ro 
The Act does not allow the transaction to proceed by a 
majority vote of the remaining shareholders even if it was 
the express wish of the absent shareholders. 
Without doubt, it is preferable, where possible that a 
major transaction have the approval of all shareholders 
entitled to vote. The defect in the approach taken in the 
Act is that it does not give the members of XYZ Limited an 
option. Section 85 applies notwithstanding the 
constitution of a company. 
In the CHC, the members are often from the one family or 
effectively an incorporated partnership. They may trust 
each others judgment, sufficiently to desire the 
flexibility to transact business by simply majority. By 
not permitting this option the Act takes away their freedom 
to contract without a valid policy reason. The 
requirements of having seventy five (75%) percent approval 
does nothing for example, to protect the interests of third 
parties dealing with the company. 
roibid, s.85(1) 
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9. DISPLACEABLE RULES - SOME EXAMPLES 
It is submitted that the most important issue that the CHC 
will face in re-registering or incorporating under the Act, 
will be whether to file a Constitution. This will depend 
on the advantages that the CHC stands to gain by opting out 
of the displaceable provisions of the Act in its 
Constitution. 
Having earlier looked at the distinctive approaches to the 
law relating to Companies in three foreign jurisdictions, 
and specifically how they endeavour to cater for, or at 
least recognise the CHC as deserving of special attention, 
a comparison can now be made with the general approach of 
the Act to the CHC corporate entity. 
Clearly the drafters rejected the Australian approach by 
not creating a separate statute applicable to the CHC. Nor 
has the Law Commission seen fit to have a separate set of 
elective provisions to cater for the CHC along the lines 
of the Delaware Subchapter. The LLC may become an option 
for the New Zealand small businesses in the future. 
Instead, in line with the Canadian approach the drafters 
have dropped the public and private company distinction and 
opted for a general statute with provisions applying to all 
companies. It has been left up to each individual CHC to 
provide for its own needs by constitution where it 
perceives that the Act does not meet its requirements. The 
Constitution therefore, may well become the fundamental 
founding document of the CHC, to be filed routinely with 
its incorporation documentation. 
It is proposed to analyse a number of the Acts displaceable 
provisions here and, to examine the Law Commissions claim 
that the Act provides the flexibility required by the 
shareholders of the CHC and, that, if this is not the case 
--------
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whether the company can obtain the required flexibility by 
filing its own constitution. 
. :¼, . . 
Sections 28 and k9 of the Act respectively, set out Rights 
and Powers attached to shares and the types of shares that 
may be issued. The provisions of these sections may be 
altered by constitution. 
The provisions of Section 28 provide for all shares to have 
/ the same rights. A CHC may find it preferable to be able 
to issue shares with special rights. For example, in a 
three member company, where one member has provided capital 
only, and does not want to have any involvement in the 
management of the business, the other two members may hold 
shares with greater voting rights attaching to them. Their 
shares may allow them to vote on matters pertaining to 
management and the third shareholders' shares could have 
a restriction placed on voting rights in respect of such 
matters. 
Section 37 allows a company in its constitution to prohibit 
the issue of shares by the board unless there is seventy 
five percent shareholder approval. Section 38, which deals 
with pre-emptive rights may also be modified by 
constitution. 
The authorisation of a distribution to shareholders by the 
Company Board can be made subject to the provisions of a 
constitution pursuant to section 44(1). 
Under Section 5~(1) a company may only purchase its own 
shares "if it is expressly permitted to do so by its 
constitution." Most CHC' s (probably without exception) 
will want to have the option to buy out the shares of a 
dissenting shareholder, wanting to leave the company. 
Under Section 58(1) (b) a company may exercise an option to 
-------1• 
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redeem shares it has issued if "The option is expressly 
permitted by the constitution ... ". Once again, most CHC' s 
will want their constitution to provide them with this 
flexibility to help facilitate easy exit of dissenting 
shareholders. 
The transfer of shares provides a further illustration of 
the potential importance to the CHC of being able to use 
a tailor-made constitution to protect its interests where 
the Act fails to do so. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, the typical CHC is 
often no more than an incorporated partnership, or small 
two or three member family business that has incorporated. 
The members of such a business will usually derive their 
main income from the venture and have most, if not all of 
their capital invested in it. It is therefore highly 
desirable from their point of view that there are 
restrictions on the transfer of shares in the company to 
outsiders. 
The Act does not contain in its provisions the type of 
tight control on transferability of shares that the members 
of a CHC would usually demand. 
') 
Section -3'2 clearly envisages restrictions being placed on 
share transfers within the company constitution. As 
drafted, the section merely states that the shares in a 
company are transferrable, subject to limitations placed 
on such transfer within the constitution. 
Section~ sets out the mechanics of how a share transfer 
is effected. Some restrictions are contained in the 
sections and can be varied or extended by the constitution 
including the right of the board to refuse or delay 
registration of the transfer of the shares if the holder 
of the shares has "failed to pay the company an amount due 
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in respect of those shares". 61 
It is submitted that these clauses will not meet the 
requirements of the typical CHC with respect to the control 
of share transfers. They would allow a disaffected 
shareholder to freely transfer his shareholding to a person 
or persons that the remaining members might find 
unacceptable. 
Because these rules are displaceable in the constitution 
the drafters of the Act have provided an out for the CHC 
and any other corporate that desires to place restrictions 
on the transfer of its shares. 
The Act, pursuant to Section 106 (1) provides that the 
business and affairs of a company must be managed by the 
Board of the Company. Sub-section (3) of s.106 allows for 
displacement of this rule by constitution. Subject to any 
restrictions in the constitution of the company the board 
of a company may delegate its powers under s.108. 
In both of the examples, in the previous paragraph, the CHC 
may want to restrict delegation of powers to certain 
persons for certain limited purposes only. Alternatively 
it may want to prevent any delegation at all. 
Appointment and removal of directors may be provided for 
I' 
in a constitution. Section i27(g), enables a company to 
place specific qualifications (in addition to those 
contained in s.)Z?) on whom can be appointed a director of 
the company. Section 129(2) provides an opportunity for 
members to entrench themselves as directors by including 
a suitable provision in the constitution, naming them as 
directors. The provision could then provide, for example, 
that the director could only be removed by unanimous 
61 Ibid s.68(5) 
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consent of all members. 
Unless altered by constitution, the provisions set out in 
the Fourth Schedule to the Act govern the proceedings of 
the board of a company. The Fourth Schedule procedures 
appear to provide considerable flexibility, for example, 
by allowing a meeting by telephone conference.~ 
Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile for a CHC to modify 
specific parts of the schedule to meet its own business 
requirements in much the same way that Companies presently 
modify Table A of the 1955 Act. 
Section 136 relating to remuneration authorised to be paid 
to a company director is another example of a displaceable 
rule. Restrictions may be placed on any of the benefits 
\ 
listed (a) to (e) in s.136(1). 
Similarly, s.137(3) allows displacement of another of the 
Acts codified rules. The rule in this case prohibits the 
indemnification of a director or employee of a company by 
that company. Under s.137 (3) indemnification is 
permissable "if expressly authorised" by the Company's 
constitution. 
The abovementioned sections are examples of some of the 
more important displaceable rules contained in the Act. 
Left unmodified, some of these rules could operate to the 
disadvantage of the CHC. 
Accordingly, it is the writer's view that a constitution 
will be an essential foundation document for the CHC. It 
will enable the CHC to take advantage of the Acts 
displaceable provisions by opting for its own rules 
tailored to meets its own requirements and expectations. 
~Ibid paragraph 3(b) Fourth Schedule 
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The writer anticipates that model constitutions for all 
manner of companies including the CHC will be available by 
the time the Act comes into force. The majority of them 
will no doubt be based to some extent on the provisions 
contained in Articles of Association previously used for 
private companies under the 1955 Act. 
However, as a number of commentators have observed, 63 it 
is the inability of the CHC to opt out of certain non-
displaceable provisions in the Act that will undoubtedly 
cause problems for the CHC. 
PART II 
A DRAFf CONSTITUTION FOR THE CLOSELY HELD 
COMPANY 
1. THE COMPANY 
A., B., and c., have been carrying on a direct mail 
marketing business as a partnership for approximately six 
months. Their business venture has to date, been quite 
successful, with weekly turnover on the increase. 
A., B., and C. are all members of the same family, each 
with hands-on management control of the business. They 
derive their only income from the business and each has 
invested most of their own capital resources into the 
venture. 
To date, the business has been operating from the home of 
A. and overheads have been relatively low for this reason. 
Msee for example Bates R. J., Closely Held Companies 
and the Companies Bill, To Close for Comfort. LLM Research 
Paper 1991 Law Faculty, V.U.W. and Dugan R. "Closely Held 
Companies under the Draft Companies Act." (1990) 20 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 161 
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Their bankers have financed the venture with an overdraft 
facility which the partners have kept under close control 
by prudent financial management. 
The business has now grown to the stage where the partners 
are confident enough to expand. Expansion plans involve 
the leasing of a premises and the purchase of a computer 
system with the capacity to handle the increased workload. 
Accordingly, the partners decide to incorporate the 
business. Their reason for forming a company is the 
limited liability it will give them, particularly with 
respect to unsecured creditors, trading with the company. 
They will also be able to borrow from the bank on a term 
loan, to purchase the computer. The company will grant a 
debenture over its assets in favour of the Bank to secure 
the loan. 
It has been agreed between A., B., and C. that they will 
all be equal shareholders and directors of the company. 
They therefore make application under s.8 of the Act and, 
having taken advice, file a constitution tailored to meet 
what they perceive to be the specific requirements of their 
company. 
The following is a proposal for a draft constitution that 
ABC Limited might file, to meets its requirements as a 
typical CHC. 
2. THE CONSTITUTION 
THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 
CONSTITUTION 
OF 
A.B.C. LIMITED 
38 
1. Preliminary Certification 
The undersigned being the applicants for incorporation of 
ABC Limited under the Companies Act 1993, hereby certify 
that the following document shall be the constitution of 
the Company. 
COMMENT: This certification is required pursuant to s.8(f) 
of the Act. 
2. Interpretation 
In this constitution, unless the context otherwise 
requires: 
(a) "the Act" means the Companies Act 1993 
(b) "constitution" means this constitution as amended 
from time to time 
(c) "the company" means A.B.C. Limited 
(d) Words importing the singular number only shall 
include the plural number and vice versa. 
(e) Words importing the masculine gender only shall 
include the feminine gender. 
(f) Words importing persons shall include corporations. 
(g) Words and expressions contained in this constitution 
shall bear the same meaning as in the Act or in any 
statutory modification of the Act in force at the 
date at which this constitution becomes binding on 
the company. 
3. Share Capital and Variation of Rights 
3 .1 Subject to the provisions of the Act and without 
prejudice to any special rights previously conferred 
on the holders of any existing shares or class of 
shares, any share in the Company may be issued with 
such preferred, deferred, or other special rights or 
such restrictions whether in regard to dividend, 
voting, return of capital, or otherwise, as the 
Company may from time to time by special resolution 
--
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determine. 
3.2 The Company may with the sanction of a special 
resolution issue any preference shares on the terms 
that they are, or at the option of the Company are 
liable, to be redeemed on such terms and in such 
manner as the Company before the issue of the shares 
may by resolution determine. 
3.3 If at any time the share capital is divided into 
different classes of shares, the rights attached to 
any class (unless otherwise provided by the terms of 
issue of the shares of that class) may, whether or 
not the Company is being wound up, be varied with the 
consent in writing of the holders of three-fourths of 
the issued shares of that class, or with the sanction 
of a special resolution passed at a general meeting 
of the holders of the shares of the class. 
COMMENT: Clause 3.1 provides A.B.C. Limited with a general 
power to attach special rights to shares that it issues to 
its members. It may also be used for issuing shares with 
restricted voting rights. 
For example, A. B. C. Limited may invite D. to become a 
shareholder, for investment purposes only. D. does not 
wish to work in the business or participate in management. 
The company could under this clause restrict the rights 
attached to D. 's shares to sharing in dividends and 
distributions only and exclude any right for D. to vote at 
a meeting of the company. 
Clause 3.2 would enable the company to issue redeemable 
preference shares. Section 2 9 ( a) of the Bill requires that 
this right, to be available must be included in the 
constitution of a Company. This power could be used by the 
Company to issue D. with redeemable shares giving the 
I 
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Company the right to repay the capital investment of D. 
after or within a specified time. This would be 
particularly appropriate if D. is interested only in making 
a short term investment in the company. 
Clause 3.3 gives the Company flexibility to vary the rights 
attaching to the shares it issues. 
4 Purchase of its share by the Company 
4.1 The Company is expressly authorised herein to 
purchase or otherwise acquire shares issued by it 
from the shareholders of the company and such 
purchase or acquisition may be exercised by the 
Company in priority to any other proposed dealings 
with such shares pursuant to clause 5 hereunder. 
4.2 Any such purchase or acquisition by the Company of 
shares it has issued shall only be made strictly in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act. 
COMMENT: These clauses are intended to give A.B.C. Limited 
express authorisation to purchase its own shares, as 
required by s.51(1) of the Act. 
For the CHC the option to purchase its own shares from 
departing shareholders will assist the company to retain 
control over its membership. It is submitted, that A.B.C. 
Limited could use these clauses in conjunction with Section 
86 of the Act to create a buy-back agreement whereby the 
Company rather then the remaining shareholders can purchase 
the shares off an existing shareholder. Section 86 
requires the unanimous consent in writing of all members. 
5 Transfer of Shares 
5. 1 The instrument of transfer of any share shall be 
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executed by or on behalf of the transferor and 
transferee, or otherwise in such manner as may from 
time to time be prescribed or permitted by statute. 
The transferor shall be deemed to remain a holder of 
the share until the name of the transferee is entered 
in the register of members in respect thereof. 
5.2 Subject to such of the restrictions of this 
constitution as may be applicable, any member may 
transfer all or any of his shares by instrument in 
writing in any usual or common form or any other form 
which the directors may approve. 
5.3 Transfer of shares shall be subject to the following 
provision: 
(a) No person or member shall be entitled to sell, 
transfer or otherwise dispose of the beneficial 
interest in any shares or give any mortgage charge or 
proxy or make any declaration of trust or become 
party to any transaction intended to or which could 
result in the beneficial ownership of such shares 
being disposed of or transferred otherwise than in 
accordance with this constitution and whether to a 
member or any other person if any member or other 
person whom the directors are prepared to register as 
a shareholder is willing to acquire the same pursuant 
to the provisions set out below. 
Where any member is a company (other than a company 
listed on any recognised Stock Exchange) any change 
in the principal shareholding of the member of any 
holding company of the member altering the effective 
control of the member shall be deemed to be a 
transfer of shares. 
(b) For the purposes of this Clause and the succeeding 
(c) 
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clauses of this Section 5, the term "person or 
member" includes (but without limiting its 
generality) the member, his executor or 
administrator, or other personal representative, 
trustee in bankruptcy, the trustee of any trust 
created by the member in respect of the shares and 
all persons claiming interest through or under the 
member. 
(i) Except where the transfer is made pursuant 
to clauses 5.4 or 5.5 hereof, any person or 
member (hereinafter called "the proposing 
transferor") who may desire to sell 
transfer or otherwise dispose of the 
beneficial interest in any shares as 
aforesaid shall give notice in writing 
(hereinafter called "a transfer notice") to 
the Company that he desires to transfer the 
same. Such a transfer notice shall specify 
the sum the proposing transferor considers 
to be the value thereof and shall (subject 
as is hereinafter in this clause provided) 
constitute the company his agent for the 
sale of the share to any member or members 
of the company or other person or persons 
nominated by the directors at the sum so 
fixed or at the option of the purchasing 
member or members or person or persons 
nominated by the directors of the Company 
at the fair value to be fixed in accordance 
with paragraph (v) of this clause. If a 
transfer notice shall include several 
shares it shall not operate as if it was a 
separate transfer notice in respect of each 
such share and the proposing transferor 
shall be under no obligation to sell or 
transfer part only of the shares specified 
I 
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in the transfer notice. A transfer notice 
shall not be revocable without the sanction 
of the directors in writing. 
(ii) In the event of any person or member 
selling, transferring or otherwise 
disposing of the beneficial interest in any 
shares as aforesaid and failing to give a 
transfer notice as provided in paragraph 
(i) above the directors may give notice 
requiring the holder of such shares to give 
a transfer notice as provided in paragraph 
(i) above and unless within fourteen (14) 
days of such notice the holder shall so 
give a transfer notice, he shall be deemed 
at the expiration of that period to have 
actually given such notice in respect of 
such shares specifying as the value thereof 
the fair value as fixed in accordance with 
paragraph (v) of this clause and thereupon 
the directors may proceed in all respects 
as if such member had so given such a 
transfer notice and this clause shall be 
read so as to include such a notional 
transfer notice. 
( iii) Subject to 
constitution 
the provisions of this 
and specifically subject to 
the prior right of the company to purchase 
its own shares under clause ( 4) hereof 
until otherwise determined by the company 
by special resolution the shares specified 
in any transfer notice given to the Company 
as aforesaid shall be dealt with as 
follows: 
( a) The said shares shall be offered in 
,, 
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the first instance to the holders of 
the class of shares contained in the 
transfer notice as nearly as may be in 
proportion to the number of existing 
shares in that class held by them 
respectively and the offer shall in 
each case limit the time within which 
the same, if not accepted, will be 
deemed to be declined, and may at the 
time contain a notification that any 
such shareholder who desires an 
allotment of shares in excess of his 
proportion should, in his reply to the 
Company, state how many excess shares 
he desires to have. 
(b) If all such shareholders do not claim 
their proportions the unclaimed shares 
shall be used for satisfying the 
claims in excess. 
(c) If thereafter any shares specified in 
a transfer notice and offered as 
aforesaid shall not have been 
accepted, the directors may offer such 
shares to any person or persons whom 
they are prepared to register as a 
shareholder or shareholders. 
(iv) If the Company shall within the space of 
two (2) calendar months after being served 
with such transfer notice find a member or 
members or any person or persons willing to 
purchase the shares (herein called "the 
transferee" or "the transferees") whom the 
directors in their discretion are prepared 
to register as a shareholder or 
(v) 
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shareholders, and shall give notice thereof 
to the proposing transferor, such 
transferor shall be bound upon payment of 
the price or fair value as herein provided 
(subject to any lien which the Company may 
have under this constitution and by 
deduction thereof) to transfer the shares 
to the transferee or transferees. 
In case any difference arises between the 
proposing transferor and a transferee as to 
the fair value of the shares such fair 
value shall be fixed on the application of 
either party by a person to be nominated by 
the President for the time being of the New 
Zealand Society of Accountants, or if any 
reason he refuses or is unable to make a 
nomination, then to be nominated by the 
President of the New Zealand Law Society. 
Such person when nominated and in 
certifying the sum which in his opinion is 
the fair value of the shares shall be 
considered to be acting as an expert and 
not as an arbitrator and accordingly the 
Arbitration Act 1908 shall not apply. 
(vi) If in any case the proposing transferor, 
after becoming bound as aforesaid, makes 
default in transferring the shares the 
Company may execute a transfer or transfers 
of the shares on behalf of the proposing 
transferor and the Company may receive the 
purchase money (subject to any lien in 
favour of the Company as aforesaid) in 
trust for the proposing transferor. The 
directors receipt shall be a good discharge 
to the transferees for the purchase price 
(vii) 
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and no question shall be raised as to the 
title of the transferees to the shares 
after they are registered as the holders 
thereof. 
If the Company shall not within the space 
of two ( 2) calendar months after being 
served with a transfer notice find a member 
or members or other person or persons whom 
the directors are prepared to register as 
a shareholder or shareholders willing to 
purchase the shares and give notice in the 
manner aforesaid, the proposing transferor 
shall at any time within three (3) calendar 
months afterwards be at liberty to sell and 
transfer the shares to any person at a 
price not lower than the value specified in 
the transfer notice or the fair value fixed 
as aforesaid and the prior paragraphs of 
this constitution shall not apply to such 
transfer. 
(a) Any shares may be transferred by a member or by the 
trustee of any trust created by a member to any child 
or other issue, adopted child, wife or husband of 
such member or to a trustee of any trust which is in 
the opinion of the directors exclusively or 
principally for the benefit of one or more of the 
aforesaid persons and any shares of a deceased member 
may be transferred by his executor, administrator or 
trustee to any child or other issue, adopted child, 
widow or widower of such deceased member or to a 
trustee of any trust which is in the opinion of the 
directors exclusively and principally for the benefit 
of any of the aforesaid persons, and shares standing 
in the name of the trustee of the will of any 
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deceased member or of any such trust may be 
transferred upon any change of trustee to the trustee 
for the time being of such will or trust and the 
restrictions of clause 5.3 hereof shall not apply to 
any transfer authorised by this subclause. 
(b) If any shares of a deceased member are not 
transferred to a relative or relatives of a class or 
classes referred to in paragraph (a) hereof or are 
not in the opinion of the directors held by the 
executors administrators or trustees exclusively or 
principally for the benefit of any such relative or 
relatives, the executors administrators or trustees 
of the deceased member's estate or other trustees 
shall not later then twelve ( 12) months from the 
death of such member, give a transfer notice in 
accordance with subclause 5.3(c) hereof and all the 
provisions of that subclause shall apply accordingly. 
5.5 Any member may sell transfer or otherwise dispose of 
the beneficial interest in any shares to any person 
(whether or not a member of the Company) with prior 
written consent of not less then seventy five percent 
of all other members of the Company for such 
consideration (if any) and otherwise upon such terms 
and conditions (if any) as may be agreed upon by such 
other members and specified in the written consent 
AND the restrictions contained in clause 5.3 hereof 
shall not apply to any sale transfer or other 
disposition authorised by this clause. 
5.6 The directors may refuse to register any transfer of 
a share or shares: 
(a) Where the Company has a lien on the share or shares; 
or 
• 
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(b) Where the shares are not fully paid up, or the holder 
of the shares has failed to pay the Company an amount 
due in respect of those shares; or 
(c) Where the directors have notice of any agreement by 
the shareholder to transfer only to some specified 
person or persons or subject to some specified 
condition or conditions; or 
(d) Where the instrument of transfer is not accompanied 
by the certificate of the shares to which it relates 
or such other evidence as the directors may 
reasonably require to show the right of the 
transferor to make the transfer; or 
( e) Where the instrument of transfer is in respect of 
more than one class of shares. 
The directors may also in their absolute and uncontrolled 
discretion refuse to register any transfer of shares to any 
person whether a member of not and shall not be bound to 
give any reason or specify any grounds therefore. 
5.7 
The registration of transfers may be suspended at such 
tlmes and for such periods as the directors may from time 
to time determine: Provided that registration shall not 
be suspended for more than thirty (30) days in any year. 
COMMENT: The main objective of these clauses is to ensure 
that the director/shareholders of A.B.C. Limited have as 
much control as possible over the transfer of its shares. 
A.B.C. Limited is a typical CHC. The members want to be 
able to ensure that they can veto the transfer of an 
interest in their company to an undesirable outsider. 
• 
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Clause 5.3(c) (iii) (a) is a pre-emptive provision whereby 
(subject to the Companies prior right to purchase), the 
shares of an existing shareholder must be offered to the 
existing shareholders first. 
Clause 5.6 gives the directors an unfettered discretion to 
refuse to register any transfer of shares. 
6 Appointment of Directors 
6.1 Unless and until otherwise determined by the Company 
by special resolution of the shareholders in general 
meeting there shall be not less than one (1) director 
and no more than three (3) and the first directors of 
the Company shall be A., B., and C. 
6.2 All directors of the Company shall hold office until 
they or any of them are removed by special resolution 
or until they vacate office pursuant to Clause 7.1. 
6.3 The directors shall have power at any time and from 
time to time to appoint any person to be a director , 
either to fill a casual vacancy or as an addition to 
the existing directors but so that the total number 
of directors shall not at any time exceed the number 
fixed in accordance with this constitution. 
6. 4 The Company may by special resolution remove any 
director. Any such removal shall be without 
prejudice to any claim that the director may have for 
damages for breach of any contract of service between 
him and the Company. 
6.5 The Company may by special resolution appoint another 
person in place of a director removed from off ice 
under the last preceding clause and without prejudice 
to the powers of the directors under clause 6 · 3 
• 
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hereof, the Company in general meeting may appoint 
any person to be a director provided that the total 
number of directors shall not at any time exceed the 
number fixed in accordance with this constitution. 
Disqualification of Directors 
7.1 The office of director shall be vacated if the 
director: 
(a) Ceases to be a director by virtue of the Act; or 
(b) Becomes bankrupt or makes any arrangement or 
composition with his creditors generally; or 
(c) Becomes prohibited from being a director by reason of 
any order made under the Act; or 
(d) Becomes of unsound mind, or becomes a person subject 
to a property order under the Protection of Personal 
and Property Rights Act 1988; or 
(e) Resigns his office by notice in writing to the 
Company. 
COMMENT: Clauses 6 and 7 are designed to entrench A., B., 
and c. as directors of the Company and to give them as much 
certainty of tenure as possible, whilst also providing for 
removal and or resignation. 
The restriction on the number of directors may only be 
amended by special resolution altering the relevant 
constitutional clause. 64 In the case of A. B. C. Limited 
this would require the unanimous consent of A., B., and c. 
8 Indemnity and Insurance 
8.1 Subject to Section 137 of the Act, the Company may 
indemnify and effect insurance for any director or 
employee of the Company for any costs incurred by him 
64Above N.57, s.26(c) (2) 
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in any proceeding: 
(a) That relates to liability for any act or omission in 
his capacity as a director or employee; and 
(b) In which judgment is given in his favour, or in which 
he is acquitted, or which is discontinued. 
8.2 Subject to Section 137 of the Act, the Company may 
indemnify and effect insurance for any director or 
employee of the Company in respect of: 
(a) Liability to any person other than the Company or a 
related company for any act or omission in his or her 
capacity as a director or employee; or 
(b) Costs incurred by that director or employee in 
defending or settling any claim or proceeding 
relating to any such liability. 
COMMENT: Clause 8 in intended to expressly authorise 
A.B.C. Limited (at the Company's option) to indemnify and 
or effect a policy of insurance for its directors or 
employees. Section 137 of the Act limits the extent of the 
indemnity by reference to the directors duties specified 
in s.109 of the same. 
Without this express authorisation, any indemnification 
sought to be given would be invalid pursuant to s.137. 
It is submitted that A.B.C. Limited should have the option 
to indemnify and or insure in its constitution. At the 
very least it would give the directors the opportunity to 
protect themselves against personal liability resulting 
from a successful suit against one of them by a creditor 
of the company. 
Execution Clause 
Certified this day of 19_ by the 
applicants for incorporation of A.B.C. Limited as being the 
constitution of the Company. 
SIGNED by A 
in the presence of: 
SIGNED by B 
in the presence of: 
• SIGNED by C 
in the presence of: 
• 
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CONCLUSION 
The drafters of the Act have attempted to codify, in a 
single piece of legislation, a set of legal rules to cater 
for all corporate entities. The extent to which this 
approach will succeed will only become clear after several 
years of practical application of the legislation. 
In the course of this paper the writer has identified a 
number of important areas where the Act fails to adequately 
meet the needs of the CHC. 
The draft constitution in Part II of the paper provides an 
example of how the displaceable rules may be modified to 
assist the CHC to meet efficiency and flexibility 
requirements. 
It is not intended to be an exhaustive document. Depending 
on the particular CHC and the perceived needs of its 
incorporators, its constitution may be more or less 
extensive, than the within constitution. However, there 
is not doubt that incorporators of a CHC, will be involved 
in considerable expense in modifying the rules to suit 
their needs. 
It is submitted that the legislators have, at the end of 
the day, been too restrictive. The Canadian Business 
Corporations Act has many more displaceable rules then our 
own. The rather large number of non-displaceable rules in 
the Act deny the CHC the real flexibility it deserves. 
Even with the existence of the unanimous assent provisions 
in Section 86 there are still far too many unnecessary 
procedural requirements placed on the CHC. 
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